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UNCLEAR AUTHORITY, UNCLEAR FUTURES:  
PREEMPTION CHALLENGES TO STATE 
LEGISLATION PROVIDING IN-STATE TUITION 
BENEFITS TO UNDOCUMENTED STUDENTS 
PURSUING HIGHER EDUCATION 
Julia R. Kim* 
 
Exercising its federal power to regulate immigration, Congress has 
responded to illegal immigration by enacting deterrent legislation that 
includes provisions denying public benefits to undocumented immigrants.  
One of these provisions, 8 U.S.C. § 1623, explicitly bars states from 
providing postsecondary education benefits to undocumented immigrants 
on the basis of in-state residency.  As a consequence, undocumented young 
adults—many of whom grew up and received their primary and secondary 
education in the United States—are effectively barred from pursuing higher 
education by their ineligibility for in-state tuition rates and financial aid.  
Some states, however, have evaded the § 1623 bar by providing 
undocumented students with in-state tuition rates for which eligibility is not 
explicitly based on state residency. 
This Note examines whether the states that choose to affirmatively 
provide in-state tuition benefits to their undocumented students are 
preempted from doing so by § 1623.  It concludes that properly crafted 
state legislation is not preempted by federal law, though the most effective 
and sensible resolution to the conflicting views on this issue calls for 
Congress to repeal § 1623 and offer deserving undocumented students a 
pathway to lawful immigration status and the opportunity to pursue higher 
education. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Congress has been attempting to control illegal immigration for decades.1  
Despite these efforts, millions of undocumented immigrants have continued 
to enter the United States and establish lives with their families.2  Their 
children are educated in public schools and socialized into American 
culture, growing up to be indistinguishable from classmates who are 
citizens or otherwise lawfully present.3  Many excel in school, develop their 
potential to contribute to society, and aspire to continue their education at 
the postsecondary level, only to find that their unlawful immigration status, 
federal laws, and a lack of financial resources prevent those dreams from 
becoming reality.4 
An issue for Congress has been whether undocumented children should 
be provided with the opportunity to fulfill their dreams of higher 
education.5  This debate represents the complex struggle between state 
regulation of educational opportunities and the need to deal with illegal 
immigration as a federal matter.6  The debate has manifested itself in 
Congress’s attempts to pass the Development, Relief, and Education for 
Alien Minors (DREAM) Act,7 which would provide eligible undocumented 
young adults with a gateway to a postsecondary education and lawful 
immigration status in the United States.8  This legislation arose out of 
recognition of these young adults’ potential to contribute back to American 
society.9 
 
 1. See HELENE HAYES, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE UNDOCUMENTED:  
AMBIVALENT LAWS, FURTIVE LIVES 4 (2001). 
 2. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED 
IMMIGRANT POPULATION:  NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, 2010, at 9 (2010), available at 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf. 
 3. See WILLIAM PEREZ, WE ARE AMERICANS:  UNDOCUMENTED STUDENTS PURSUING 
THE AMERICAN DREAM xii (2009). 
 4. See id. at xii–xiii. 
 5. See 147 CONG. REC. 15361 (2001) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 
 6. See Michael A. Olivas, Storytelling Out Of School:  Undocumented College 
Residency, Race, and Reaction, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1019, 1021–25 (1995). 
 7. DREAM Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 8. See Id. 
 9. See ORRIN HATCH, AMENDING THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION REFORM ACT OF 1996, S. 
REP. NO. 108-224, at 2 (2004). 
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Though Congress has attempted several times to pass the DREAM Act, it 
has failed to become law.10  In response, many states have independently 
opened up postsecondary educational opportunities for undocumented 
students by offering them the benefit of in-state tuition rates.11  In several 
instances, such state legislation has been challenged in the courts as being 
preempted by federal laws that proscribe the provision of public benefits to 
undocumented immigrants.12 
This Note examines whether state laws providing in-state tuition rates to 
undocumented students are preempted by federal law in 8 U.S.C. § 1621 
and § 1623, which prohibit the provision of public benefits, including 
postsecondary education benefits, to undocumented immigrants.  Part I of 
this Note provides background on the regulation of undocumented 
immigration, and then explores federal and state laws and case law relating 
to the postsecondary education rights of undocumented students.  Part I also 
looks at the standing and preemption doctrines that pervade the challenges 
brought in court against those state statutes that allow postsecondary 
education benefits to reach undocumented immigrants. 
Part II then focuses on the arguments for whether § 1621 and § 1623 
preempt state laws providing in-state tuition rates to undocumented 
immigrants.  This Note explores the standing and preemption issues 
primarily through the lens of the litigation in Day v. Bond13 and Martinez v. 
Regents of the University of California,14 which both challenged such state 
laws. 
Finally, Part III of this Note argues that federal law does not fully bar 
states from providing undocumented students with postsecondary education 
benefits, but that, nevertheless, the best resolution to the conflict would 
come through federal legislation providing undocumented students with 
better access to a postsecondary education and lawful immigration status in 
the United States. 
I.  FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATORY POWERS REGARDING 
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION AND POSTSECONDARY 
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNDOCUMENTED STUDENTS: 
CURRENT STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROVERSIES 
Part I of this Note provides background on undocumented immigrant 
students in the United States and the federal and state powers to regulate 
matters concerning them, specifically in the area of postsecondary 
 
 10. See Michael A. Olivas, The Political Economy of the DREAM Act and the 
Legislative Process:  A Case Study of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 55 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1757, 1793–1802 (2009). 
 11. Undocumented Student Tuition:  State Action, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Oct. 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=12846. 
 12. See generally Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007); Immigration Reform 
Coal. of Tex. v. Texas, 706 F. Supp. 2d 760 (S.D. Tex. 2010); Martinez v. Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2961 (2011). 
 13. 500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 14. 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010). 
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education benefits.  To that end, Part I.A discusses the growth of the 
undocumented immigrant population and Congress’s efforts to deter illegal 
immigration.  Part I.B then explores the education rights of the 
undocumented as presented in Supreme Court case law. 
Next, Part I.C examines Congress’s attempts to address the issue of 
undocumented students’ access to a postsecondary education through the 
DREAM Act, which would repeal federal law proscribing the provision of 
postsecondary education benefits to undocumented immigrants.  Part I.D 
then discusses various approaches at the state level to providing 
postsecondary education opportunities by offering in-state tuition rates to 
undocumented students. 
Parts I.E and I.F then survey the issues relating to preemption challenges 
brought against state laws providing in-state tuition rates to undocumented 
students.  Part I.E focuses on the standing challenges that have blocked 
such preemption challenges from being fully litigated.  Part I.F then 
considers the preemption doctrine that has developed relating to federal 
immigration law in order to lay the foundation for its application to state 
laws providing undocumented students with in-state tuition rate benefits. 
A.  Federal Regulation of Immigration and the 
Undocumented Immigrant Population 
The Constitution does not expressly authorize the federal government to 
regulate immigration.15  Since the nineteenth century, however, the 
Supreme Court has considered immigration regulation to be an implied 
power, existing “as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the 
Constitution” to the federal government.16  The Supreme Court has thus 
consistently held that the regulation of immigration is a federal power.17 
The federal statutory scheme regulating immigration classifies all 
lawfully admitted aliens as either immigrants or nonimmigrants.18  
Unlawfully present aliens are those who have entered the United States 
without valid entry or immigration visas, overstayed their nonimmigrant 
 
 15. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE 
LAW AND POLICY 116 (5th ed. 2009). 
 16. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 
(1889) (upholding the plenary power of Congress to exclude noncitizens from the United 
States); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 731 (1893) (upholding 
Congress’s plenary power to deport noncitizens from the United States, stating that “[t]he 
question whether, and upon what conditions, these aliens shall be permitted to remain within 
the United States being one to be determined by the political departments of the government, 
the judicial department cannot properly express an opinion upon the wisdom, the policy or 
the justice of the measures enacted by Congress in the exercise of the powers confided to it 
by the Constitution over this subject”). 
 17. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354–55 (1976) (“Power to regulate immigration 
is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.” (citing Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 748; Chy 
Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 276 (1876); Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259, 272–
73 (1876); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 483 (1849))). 
 18. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2006); LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 15, at 250. 
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visas, or violated the terms of their admission in some way.19  Due to the 
undocumented nature of their presence, having exact statistics on 
undocumented immigrants20 in the United States proves difficult.  
Nevertheless, various studies give a sense as to the size and growth of the 
undocumented population. 
Concerns with the size of the undocumented immigrant population in the 
United States began to develop in the mid-to-late 1970s, when it reached an 
estimated size of one million people.21  The population continued to grow 
throughout the early to mid-1980s at a steady rate of approximately 200,000 
people per year.22  In 1986, after the undocumented population had grown 
to an estimated 2.5–3.5 million,23 Congress responded with the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act (IRCA).24  Congress designed IRCA to lay a basis 
for effective immigration law enforcement going forward by first 
“eliminating a voiceless, rightless permanent underclass.”25  To that end, 
IRCA granted amnesty to certain undocumented immigrants already living 
in the country by giving them lawful immigration status,26 and placed 
sanctions on employers who hired undocumented immigrants.27 
Despite Congress’s efforts, it soon became clear that IRCA had failed to 
stop illegal immigration, as the undocumented population continued to 
grow steadily at rates of over 200,000 people per year.28  The Immigration 
and Nationalization Service (INS) estimated that by 1996, there were 
approximately five million undocumented immigrants living in the United 
States, with over half (2.7 million) from Mexico.29  Given the magnitude of 
the unauthorized immigrant population, Congress took stronger measures to 
restrict undocumented immigration by enacting the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).30  IIRIRA 
 
 19. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 15, at 1140; see also JEFFREY S. PASSEL, 
PEW HISPANIC CNTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT 
POPULATION IN THE U.S.:  ESTIMATES BASED ON THE MARCH 2005 CURRENT POPULATION 
SURVEY 16 (2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf (“Virtually all 
unauthorized [immigrants] fall into two categories:  those who overstayed their visas or 
those classified by the government as ‘entries without inspection,’ or EWIs.”). 
 20. This Note refers to unauthorized aliens using the term “undocumented immigrants” 
instead of the statutory term “illegal aliens,” which carries a pejorative connation. See 
LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 15, at 1140–41. 
 21. Jeffrey S. Passel, Undocumented Immigration to the United States:  Numbers, 
Trends, and Characteristics, in ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN AMERICA:  A REFERENCE 
HANDBOOK 27, 32 (David W. Haines & Karen E. Rosenblum eds., 1999). 
 22. Id. at 33. 
 23. Id. at 32 (estimate based on the 1980 Census). 
 24. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 
(codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 25. Hayes, supra note 1, at 4. 
 26. See id.; see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1160, 1187, 1188, 1255(a) (2006). 
 27. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2006). 
 28. Passel, supra note 21, at 37. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.). 
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aimed “to improve deterrence of illegal immigration to the United States.”31  
It worked in conjunction with the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which Congress had enacted 
six weeks prior to IIRIRA,32 to discourage undocumented immigration by 
“dramatically chang[ing] the landscape [of federal benefits available to 
undocumented immigrants] in many areas of health and welfare.”33  Section 
411 of PRWORA, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a), specifically denied public 
benefits to noncitizens, including permanent residents, by stating that “an 
alien . . . is not eligible for any State or local public benefit.”34  IIRIRA 
imposed other specific restrictions, such as section 505, codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1623, which specifically proscribes the availability of postsecondary 
education benefits to unauthorized immigrants.35 
Nevertheless, the deterrent efforts behind PRWORA and IIRIRA proved 
ineffective, as evidenced by a study on behalf of the Pew Hispanic Center 
showing that the undocumented immigration population had grown to 11.1 
million people by 2005, and that about two-thirds of them had arrived in the 
ten years since 1996.36  Most came from Mexico, numbering at 6.2 million, 
or 56 percent of the unauthorized population.37  Out of the total 11.1 
million, 1.8 million, or 16 percent, were children.38 
The size of the undocumented immigrant population has appeared to 
remain relatively stable in recent years after a slight decline from its peak at 
12 million in 2007.39  This decline has been attributed to the decrease in the 
influx of undocumented immigrants from Mexico.40  In 2009, the Center for 
Immigration Studies (CIS) estimated that there were 10.8 million 
unauthorized immigrants present in the United States.41  Within these 10.8 
million, “roughly two-thirds of all adult illegal aliens are young, less-
 
 31. H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 1 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
 32. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, §§ 400–51, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260–76 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 and 42 
U.S.C.). 
 33. Olivas, supra note 10, at 1763. 
 34. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (2006). 
 35. Id. § 1623.  The text of § 1623  reads: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an alien who is not lawfully present in 
the United States shall not be eligible on the basis of residence within a State (or a 
political subdivision) for any postsecondary education benefit unless a citizen or 
national of the United States is eligible for such a benefit (in no less an amount, 
duration, and scope) without regard to whether the citizen or national is such a 
resident. 
Id. 
 36. Passel, supra note 19, at 1–2. 
 37. Id. at 4 (noting that 22 percent came from the rest of Latin America, 13 percent from 
Asia, 6 percent from Europe and Canada, and the remaining 3 percent from Africa and other 
countries). 
 38. Id. at 8. 
 39. Passel & Cohn, supra note 2, at 9. 
 40. See id. at 10. 
 41. Steven A. Camarota & Karen Jensenius, A Shifting Tide:  Recent Trends in the 
Illegal Immigrant Population, CENTER FOR IMMIGR. STUD. 1 (July 2009), http://www.cis.org/
articles/2009/shiftingtide.pdf. 
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educated, Hispanic immigrants.”42  According to a more recent study 
released by the Pew Hispanic Center in February 2011, of the estimated 
11.2 million undocumented immigrants, approximately 1 million are 
children.43 
These statistics make clear that there is, and will continue to be for some 
time, a significant number of undocumented immigrants who would benefit 
from access to a postsecondary education.  There are currently an estimated 
700,000 undocumented immigrants under the age of 30 who have graduated 
from high school in the United States, as well as an additional 700,000 
currently under the age of 18 and enrolled in school.44  Many of these 
undocumented students have spent almost their whole lives in the United 
States, living as Americans, indistinguishable from their citizen peers.45  
However, for those undocumented students with the desire to further their 
education at postsecondary institutions, there are usually insurmountable 
financial barriers due to the combination of high tuition costs and 
ineligibility for governmental grant, loan, and work assistance programs.46  
In addition, most states do not allow resident undocumented students to 
receive in-state tuition rates.47  As a result, estimates of the number of 
undocumented students who have lived in the United States for five years 
or longer, graduated from a U.S. high school, and enrolled in a U.S. college 
in a given year number only in the thousands.48  Immigration status clearly 
serves as an effective bar to the pursuit of a higher education for many long-
term undocumented young adults.49 
B.  Educational Rights of Undocumented Immigrants 
Since Brown v. Board of Education,50 the Supreme Court has affirmed a 
right to equal educational opportunities and the significant role that 
education plays in modern society.  While Brown addressed the segregation 
of children in so-called separate-but-equal public schools,51  the Court’s 
 
 42. Id. at 3.  Defining “young, less-educated, Hispanic immigrants” as “Hispanic 
immigrants 18–40 years of age with no more than a high school education living in the 
United States.” Id.  More precisely, CIS estimates that three-fourths of the 6,703,000 young, 
less-educated, foreign-born Hispanic population present in the United States in 2009 were 
unlawfully present. Id. at 3–4. 
 43. Passel & Cohn, supra note 2, at 13. 
 44. Up to 1.4 Million Unauthorized Immigrants Could Benefit from New Deportation 
Policy, PEW HISPANIC CENTER (June 15, 2012), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/06/15/up-
to-1-4-million-unauthorized-immigrants-could-benefit-from-new-deportation-policy/. 
 45. See Perez, supra note 3, at xii. 
 46. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 15, at 1210. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See Jeffrey S. Passel, URBAN INST., Further Demographic Information Relating to 
the DREAM Act, CENTER HUM. RTS. & CONST. L., 2 (Oct. 21, 2003), http://www.national
immigrationreform.org/proposed/DREAM/UrbanInstituteDREAM.pdf (estimating that in 
2003, college enrollment amounted to about 7,000–13,000 undocumented immigrants who 
have lived in the U.S. for five years or longer and have graduated from U.S. high schools). 
 49. See Perez, supra note 3, at xii. 
 50. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 51. See id. at 493. 
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holding recognized the supreme importance of education in preparing 
children to survive and succeed in modern society.52  The Court also found 
significant that segregated children would develop “a feeling of inferiority 
as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in 
a way unlikely ever to be undone.”53 
The Court has nonetheless never taken steps toward opening access to a 
postsecondary education for undocumented students.  Beginning in 1973 
with San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,54 the Supreme 
Court held that there is no fundamental right to education.  While 
recognizing the “grave significance of education both to the individual and 
to our society,”55 the Court held that education is not a fundamental right 
explicitly or implicitly afforded protection under the Constitution.56 
Interestingly, while San Antonio continued to remain good law, the Court 
held six years later in Plyler v. Doe57 that states could not deprive 
undocumented children of a K–12 education.  At the time, Texas education 
laws withheld from local school districts state funds for the education of the 
children of unlawfully admitted immigrants, and they also allowed districts 
to deny these children enrollment in their public schools.58  Analyzing the 
Texas statute under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court first emphasized 
that undocumented immigrants are persons within the state’s jurisdiction 
and are thus entitled to the equal protection of its laws.59  Though declining 
to classify undocumented aliens as a suspect class,60 Justice Brennan 
expressed his concern that the inability to bar unlawful entry into the 
country and employment of the unlawfully admitted had resulted in a 
“shadow population” or underclass of undocumented aliens.61  
Accordingly, the Court used a form of intermediate scrutiny62 and held that 
 
 52. See id. (“Today [education] is a principal instrument in awakening the child to 
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust 
normally to his environment.  In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.”). 
 53. Id. at 494. 
 54. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 55. Id. at 30 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 56. See id. at 35. 
 57. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 58. See id. at 205. 
 59. See id. at 210; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 60. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19 (“We reject the claim that ‘illegal aliens’ are a ‘suspect 
class.’ . . .  Unlike most of the classifications that we have recognized as suspect, entry into 
this class . . . is the product of voluntary action.  Indeed, entry into the class is itself a 
crime.”). 
 61. Id. at 218–19 (“This situation raises the specter of a permanent caste of 
undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap 
labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes available to citizens and 
lawful residents.”). 
 62. See Olivas, supra note 6, at 1041–43 (discussing Justice Brennan’s choice of 
intermediate scrutiny over strict scrutiny because undocumented aliens were not a suspect 
class and education was not a fundamental right, as well as his rejection of minimal 
scrutiny). 
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depriving undocumented children of a public education, which would 
prepare them to be productive members of society, would penalize them.63  
The Court held that the Texas statute did not advance any substantial state 
interest,64 thus reemphasizing the Court’s recognition of the importance of 
education in providing children with an opportunity for success in life.65  
Moreover, the Court refused to limit the availability of a basic education for 
children who were brought unlawfully to the United States by no choice of 
their own, and for whom the opportunity to obtain legal status remained 
unclear.66 
While the Supreme Court’s decisions in Brown, Rodriguez, and Plyler do 
not directly reach the issue of undocumented students’ access to a 
postsecondary education, it has become difficult to ignore the issue of 
whether hundreds of thousands of undocumented students who have 
received their primary and secondary education in the United States as a 
result of Plyler would nonetheless be barred from pursuing higher 
education.67 
C.  The DREAM Act:  A Proposed Repeal of 8 U.S.C. § 1623 
The necessity of a higher education for success in society68 has been 
well-recognized by those in Congress who have been working to pass the 
DREAM Act.69  Senator Orrin Hatch first introduced this bill in 2001 to 
effectively repeal 8 U.S.C. § 1623, the portion of federal law prohibiting 
states from granting undocumented students in-state rates for tuition and 
fees based on in-state residency.70 
The purpose of the DREAM Act, as introduced in 2001, was to ensure 
that long-term resident undocumented immigrant youths, who were brought 
 
 63. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220–21 (“[E]ducation has a fundamental role in maintaining the 
fabric of our society.  We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation 
when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our 
social order rests.”); see also id. at 222 (“The inestimable toll of th[e] deprivation [of the 
ability to read and write] on the social economic, intellectual, and psychological well-being 
of the individual, and the obstacle it poses to individual achievement, make it most difficult 
to reconcile the cost or the principle of a status-based denial of basic education with the 
framework of equality embodied in the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 64. Id. at 230. 
 65. See id. at 223 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). 
 66. See id. at 230 (“[T]he record is clear that many of the undocumented children 
disabled by this classification will remain in this country indefinitely, and that some will 
become lawful residents or citizens of the United States.  It is difficult to understand 
precisely what the State hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and perpetuation of a 
subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of 
unemployment, welfare, and crime.  It is thus clear that whatever savings might be achieved 
by denying these children an education, they are wholly insubstantial in light of the costs 
involved to these children, the State, and the Nation.”). 
 67. See Perez, supra note 3, at xii–xiii. 
 68. See id. at xxvi (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics data showing higher earnings to be 
tied to the credentials and skills associated with a postsecondary education). 
 69. DREAM Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 70. See id.; see also supra note 35. 
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to the United States through no choice of their own, would not be “left 
behind” from the opportunity to attain a higher education and better their 
lives.71  Senator Hatch presented the DREAM Act legislation as a way of 
ensuring that, from among the 50,000 to 70,000 undocumented youths 
graduating from high schools in the United States each year, those most 
deserving have an opportunity to achieve the American dream.72  Senator 
Hatch continued to emphasize that the DREAM Act’s function was not to 
be a form of blanket amnesty for undocumented young adult immigrants.73  
Rather, the legislation resolved a policy and fairness issue regarding the 
innocent and hard-working undocumented immigrants who have grown up 
as a part of American society and have potential to contribute value to the 
nation.74  By repealing 8 U.S.C. § 162375 and leaving “[e]ach state . . . free 
to determine whom it deems a resident for the purpose of determining in-
state tuition,” the DREAM Act would give states permission to provide 
undocumented students with access to a postsecondary education.76 
While the DREAM Act in its various forms over the years has enjoyed 
some bipartisan support,77 it has failed to become law due to the complexity 
and politics of immigration reform.78  In the most recent vote on the 
DREAM Act in December 2010, the Act passed in the House 216–198, but 
failed by five votes in the Senate to reach the sixty it needed to overcome a 
filibuster and become law.79  Thus, the states are still left with unclear 
 
 71. 147 CONG. REC. 15361 (2001) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“This legislation, 
known as the ‘DREAM Act,’ would allow children who have been brought to the United 
States through no volition of their own the opportunity to fulfill their dreams, to secure a 
college degree and legal status. The purpose of the DREAM Act is to ensure that we leave 
no child behind, regardless of his or her legal status in the United States or their parents’ 
illegal status.”). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See ORRIN HATCH, AMENDING THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION REFORM ACT OF 1996, S. 
REP. NO. 108-224, at 2 (2004). 
 74. See id. (“A great many grow up to become honest and hardworking young adults 
who are loyal to our country and who strive for academic and professional excellence. It is a 
mistake to lump these children together with adults who knowingly crossed our borders 
illegally. Instead, the better policy is to view them as the valuable resource that they are for 
our nation’s future.”). 
 75. See infra notes 84–85. 
 76. S. REP. NO. 108-224, at 4. 
 77. See Olivas, supra note 10, at 1793. 
 78. See id. at 1793–1802 (describing the failure to enact the DREAM Act of 2007, S. 
2205, 110th Cong. (2007)—in large part due to the missing votes of four key senators on 
record as supporting the legislation and the reluctance of other senators willing to vote for 
the legislation only if it would be sure to pass—and the difficulty of passing DREAM Act 
legislation where Congress and the Obama administration currently appear to be taking an 
omnibus approach to immigration reform). 
 79. DREAM Act of 2010, H.R. 5281, 111th Cong. (2010).  Without fail, the DREAM 
Act was reintroduced in the Senate in May 2011 by Senator Richard Durbin. See DREAM 
Act of 2011, S. 952, 112th Cong. (2011).  This most recent version of the bill proposed 
granting conditional permanent resident status for long-term residents who entered the 
United States at the age of 15 or younger and have been continuously present, all the while 
demonstrating good moral character, earning a high school diploma and admission to a 
postsecondary institution in the United States.  Id. at § 3.  Upon acquiring a degree from a 
postsecondary institution or completing at least two years in good standing for a bachelor’s 
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authority as to whether and how they can regulate access to postsecondary 
education benefits for undocumented students. 
D.  The Failure of the DREAM Act and State Regulation of Postsecondary 
Educational Opportunities for Undocumented Immigrants 
Though education has typically been considered an area of regulation left 
to the states,80 the states’ regulatory powers over education matters 
concerning undocumented immigrants were limited by Congress’s 
immigration reforms in 1996.81  Not only did PRWORA specifically deny 
public benefits to noncitizens,82 it also defined public benefits to include 
postsecondary education benefits.83  IIRIRA section 505, codified at 8 
U.S.C. § 1623, specifically proscribed the availability of postsecondary 
education benefits, such as in-state tuition rates, based on residence to 
unauthorized immigrants.84  Congress intended that § 1623 would make it 
so that “State or local governments may not treat an ineligible alien as a 
resident, if such action would treat the alien more favorably than a non-
resident U.S. citizen.”85 
Confusion exists, however, as to the extent of the limitation on state 
powers to enact legislation granting undocumented students in-state tuition 
rate benefits, as PRWORA gives the states some authority to exercise 
discretion over undocumented immigrant eligibility for state and local 
public benefits in 8 U.S.C. § 1621.  While § 1621(a) states that 
undocumented immigrants are ineligible for “any State or local public 
benefit,”86 under § 1621(d) 
 
degree or higher, or upon having served in the armed services for at least two years, the 
resident would be eligible to have the conditional status lifted and made permanent. Id. at § 
5. 
 80. See Brooke Wilkins, Should Public Education Be A Federal Fundamental Right?, 
2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 261, 272. 
 81. See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text. 
 82. See 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (2006). 
 83. See id. § 1621(c).  The statute provides: 
“State or local public benefit” defined 
(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), for purposes of this 
subchapter the term “State or local public benefit” means— 
(A) any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license 
provided by an agency of a State or local government or by appropriated 
funds of a State or local government; and 
(B) any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, 
postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other 
similar benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to an 
individual, household, or family eligibility unit by an agency of a State or 
local government or by appropriated funds of a State or local government. 
Id. 
 84. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 85. S. REP. NO. 104-249, at 22 (1996). 
 86. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a).  That statute provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . , an alien who is not— 
(1) a qualified alien (as defined in section 1641 of this title), 
 2012] UNCLEAR AUTHORITY, UNCLEAR FUTURES 1025 
[a] State may provide that an alien who is not lawfully present in the 
United States is eligible for any State or local public benefit for which 
such alien would otherwise be ineligible . . . only through the enactment 
of a State law after August 22, 1996, which affirmatively provides for 
such eligibility.87 
Within this context of the failed passage of the DREAM Act and the 
conflicting messages of § 1621 and § 1623, many states have taken it upon 
themselves to affirmatively provide postsecondary education benefits to 
undocumented students in the form of in-state tuition rates at their public 
colleges and universities.  As of the writing of this Note, the states 
providing undocumented students with in-state tuition rates are:  
California,88 Connecticut,89 Illinois,90 Kansas,91 Maryland,92 Nebraska,93 
New Mexico,94 New York,95 Rhode Island,96 Texas,97 Utah,98 and 
Washington.99 
As an example, Kansas’s statute affirmatively offers undocumented 
students in-state tuition rates by stating that undocumented students who 
attended and graduated from Kansas high schools are essentially 
reclassified as residents for the purposes of tuition and fees.100  On the other 
 
(2) a nonimmigrant under the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. 1101 et 
seq.], or 
(3) an alien who is paroled into the United States under section 212(d)(5) of such 
Act [8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)] for less than one year, 
is not eligible for any State or local public benefit (as defined in subsection (c) of 
this section). 
Id. (alterations in original). 
 87. Id. § 1621(d). 
 88. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (West 2012). 
 89. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10a-29 (2012). 
 90. See 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/7e-5 (2012). 
 91. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-731a (2011). 
 92. See MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 15-106.8 (LexisNexis 2011) (contingent on 
referendum). 
 93. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 85-502 (2011). 
 94. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-4.6 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 95. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 355(2)(h)(8) (McKinney 2012). 
 96. See Residency Policy, R.I. BD. OF GOVERNORS FOR HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 26, 2011), 
http://www.ribghe.org/residency1for2012.pdf.  Rhode Island’s Board of Governors for 
Higher Education implemented an in-state tuition policy for undocumented students 
effective Fall 2012 without going through the state legislature.  A bill is currently being held 
in the state legislature for further study.  See H. 7340, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2012). 
 97. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 54.052–.053 (West 2012). 
 98. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 53B-8-106 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 99. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.15.012 (2012). 
 100. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-731a (2011).  The Kansas statute provides: 
Certain persons without lawful immigration status deemed residents for purpose of 
tuition and fees. 
(a) Any individual who is enrolled or has been accepted for admission at a 
postsecondary educational institution as a postsecondary student shall be deemed 
to be a resident of Kansas for the purpose of tuition and fees for attendance at such 
postsecondary educational institution. 
(b) As used in this section: 
. . . 
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hand, California’s statute does not explicitly declare undocumented students 
to be residents for the purposes of tuition and fees, but grants 
undocumented students in-state tuition rates by basing eligibility on other 
criteria, such as three years minimum attendance at, and graduation from, a 
California high school.101  California also signed its own DREAM Act into 
state law in July 2011, allowing undocumented students to receive financial 
aid to attend state colleges and universities.102  The challenges to California 
and Kansas state statutes that allow postsecondary education benefits to 
reach undocumented students form the basis of the preemption analysis of 
this Note.103 
Conversely, there are also states that explicitly deny in-state tuition 
benefits to undocumented students.  These states currently include 
Arizona,104 Georgia,105 and Indiana, 106 which prohibit undocumented 
 
(2) “individual” means a person who (A) has attended an accredited Kansas high 
school for three or more years, (B) has either graduated from an accredited Kansas 
high school or has earned a general educational development (GED) certificate 
issued within Kansas, regardless of whether the person is or is not a citizen of the 
United States of America; and (C) in the case of a person without lawful 
immigration status, has filed with the postsecondary educational institution an 
affidavit stating that the person or the person’s parents have filed an application to 
legalize such person’s immigration status, or such person will file such an 
application as soon as such person is eligible to do so or, in the case of a person 
with a legal, nonpermanent immigration status, has filed with the postsecondary 
educational institution an affidavit stating that such person has filed an application 
to begin the process for citizenship of the United States or will file such 
application as soon as such person is eligible to do so. 
(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any individual who: 
(1) Has a valid student visa; or 
(2) at the time of enrollment, is eligible to enroll in a public postsecondary 
educational institution located in another state upon payment of fees and tuition 
required of residents of such state. 
Id. 
 101. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (West 2012).  The California statute provides in part: 
(a) A student . . . who meets all of the following requirements shall be exempt 
from paying nonresident tuition at the California State University and the 
California Community Colleges: 
(1) High school attendance in California for three or more years. 
(2) Graduation from a California high school or attainment of the equivalent 
thereof. 
(3) Registration as an entering student at, or current enrollment at, an accredited 
institution of higher education in California . . . . 
(4) In the case of a person without lawful immigration status, the filing of an 
affidavit with the institution of higher education stating that the student has filed 
an application to legalize his or her immigration status, or will file an application 
as soon as he or she is eligible to do so. 
Id. 
 102. A.B. 130, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011). 
 103. See infra Part II.B (discussing Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007)); Part 
II.C (discussing Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2961 (2011)). 
 104. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-1802, 1803, 1825 (2012). 
 105. See GA. CODE ANN. § 20-3-66 (2012). 
 106. See IND. CODE. § 21-14-11-1 (2012). 
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students from being classified as in-state students.  Colorado takes a 
different approach and does not include undocumented students in its 
regulatory scheme classifying the in-state students eligible for in-state 
tuition rates.107  South Carolina108  and Alabama109 go beyond denying in-
state tuition rates to undocumented students and explicitly bar them from 
enrolling in the state’s public postsecondary institutions. 
This clear divide between states’ attitudes on providing undocumented 
students with opportunities for a postsecondary education highlights the 
debate over whether states are preempted from providing such benefits by 
federal law. 
E.  Standing As an Obstacle to Challenging State Laws Providing 
Undocumented Students with In-State Tuition Rates 
In light of the highly politicized nature of immigration law reform and 
the unclear authority of states to grant postsecondary education benefits in 
the form of in-state tuition to undocumented residents, several courts have 
seen challenges based on § 1623 to such benefits.  These challenges have 
been brought on federal law preemption grounds and claims of violations of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.110  Federal courts, however, have dismissed 
such cases on standing grounds before even reaching the question of 
preemption.111  Thus, plaintiffs seeking to enforce § 1623 against in-state 
tuition rates face an enormous standing hurdle to having the courts fully 
address issues of preemption and the enforceability of § 1623. 
1.  Standing Generally 
Federal standing doctrine arises out of the division of powers in Article 
III of the Constitution, which limits the federal courts’ jurisdiction to 
“Cases” and “Controversies.”112 The doctrine of standing serves to identify 
those justiciable disputes that can be properly resolved in the courts.113 
Standing in federal court requires three elements.  First, the plaintiff must 
have suffered a concrete injury-in-fact to a legally protected interest; 
second, there must be a causal link between the injury and the challenged 
 
 107. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 23-7-101 to -111 (2011). 
 108. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-101-430 (2011). 
 109. See ALA. CODE § 31-13-8 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 110. See Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1130 (10th Cir. 2007); Immigration Reform Coal. 
of Tex. v. Texas, 706 F. Supp. 2d 760, 762 (S.D. Tex. 2010); Martinez v. Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 860 (Cal. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2961 (2011). 
 111. See, e.g., Day, 500 F.3d at 1139–40; Immigration Reform Coal. of Tex., 706 F. Supp. 
2d at 765; Mannschreck v. Bd. of Regents, No. Ci10-8 (D. Neb. filed Jan. 25, 2010), 
dismissed sub nom. Mannschreck v. Clare, No. Ci10-8 (D. Neb. Dec. 17, 2010). 
 112. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 113. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
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conduct; and third, it must be likely that a favorable decision of the court 
can redress the injury.114 
2.  Standing to Challenge State Legislation Granting In-State Tuition 
Benefits to Undocumented Students:  Federal vs. State Court 
The standing hurdle for plaintiffs challenging state legislation granting 
in-state tuition benefits to undocumented students is exemplified in Day, 
which challenged Kansas’s statute granting in-state tuition to 
undocumented students.115  On July 1, 2004, Kansas enacted Kansas 
Statutes Annotated section 76-731a (K.S.A. 76-731a), which classified 
eligible undocumented students as residents for the purposes of tuition and 
fees.116  U.S. citizen students at Kansas public postsecondary institutions 
who were nonresidents of Kansas and parents of those students brought suit 
against the Governor of Kansas, the members of the Board of Regents, and 
officials of the state’s universities, seeking an injunction against the 
enforcement of K.S.A. 76-731a and a declaration that it is preempted by 
federal law and unconstitutional.117 
Arguing for standing in district court, the plaintiffs asserted that K.S.A. 
76-731a caused a number of potential “injuries in fact”:  injury to their 
property rights as a result of paying out-of-state tuition while 
undocumented students were allowed to pay in-state tuition; the resulting 
scarcity of college education and increased competition for that resource; 
and the increased likelihood that they would bear the burden of higher 
tuitions in order to help Kansas state universities subsidize undocumented 
students’ tuitions.118  The court, however, held that these arguments were 
unfounded and unsupported by any evidence.119  Moreover, the plaintiffs’ 
unsupported allegations of injury were not “concrete and imminent” enough 
to constitute the injury-in-fact required for standing.120  K.S.A. 76-731a 
simply did not apply to the plaintiffs, as they would be paying out-of-state 
tuition regardless of whether K.S.A. 76-731a had been passed or not.121  
The plaintiffs thus stood “in the same shoes as any citizen,” unable to assert 
any particularized injury.122  In addition, the court found that striking down 
 
 114. See id. at 560–61. See generally ERWIN CHEMERISNKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3 
(5th ed. 2007); 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3531–3531.6 (3d ed. 2008). 
 115. See id. at 1130. 
 116. See H.B. 2145, 2003–2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2004); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 76-731a (2011). 
 117. See Day v. Sebelius, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1025–26 (D. Kan. 2005). 
 118. See id. at 1033. 
 119. See id. 
 120. Id. (“Hypothetical or conjectural harm is not sufficient.”). 
 121. See id. 
 122. Id. at 1033–34 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992) 
(reaffirming that “a plaintiff . . . claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in 
proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and 
tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case or 
controversy”)). 
 2012] UNCLEAR AUTHORITY, UNCLEAR FUTURES 1029 
K.S.A. 76-731a as preempted by federal law or in violation of federal law 
would not redress any alleged injury in a manner that would provide the 
plaintiffs with any personal benefit.123 
The court also addressed the plaintiffs’ alleged equal protection injury, 
based on the argument that K.S.A. 76-731a’s structure discriminatorily 
allowed undocumented aliens to receive in-state tuition benefits, while 
denying those benefits to out-of-state U.S. citizens.124  The court dismissed 
this claim because K.S.A. 76-731a did not deny the plaintiffs in-state 
tuition, as it was another unchallenged statute that required out-of-state 
citizens to pay out-of-state tuition.125  Because K.S.A. 76-731a did not 
apply to the plaintiffs, they could not demonstrate sufficient injury to 
establish standing on an equal protection claim.126  The Tenth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s holdings on appeal and, by dismissing on 
standing grounds, the circuit court never reached the issue of whether  Day 
demonstrates that federal courts are unwilling to find that private 
individuals have standing to challenge state legislation granting in-state 
tuition benefits to undocumented students.127  As a result, plaintiffs 
challenging state laws offering in-state tuition rates to undocumented 
students appear to prefer to keep their challenges in state courts.  In 
Immigration Reform Coalition of Texas v. Texas, which challenged a Texas 
law granting undocumented students in-state tuition benefits, the defendants 
had removed the case to federal court.128  The plaintiff, Immigration 
Reform Coalition of Texas (IRCOT), a nonprofit organization comprised of 
Texas taxpayers, sought to remand the case to state court based on its lack 
of standing in federal court, as federal law does not give plaintiffs standing 
to bring cases based solely on their status as taxpayers.129  IRCOT alleged 
that it had proper standing in state court, where standing is more 
permissive.130  The district court agreed that it had no power to grant 
injunctive relief prohibiting state use of tax money to make educational 
grants to undocumented students pursuant to state statutes.131  The court 
also held that IRCOT lacked constitutional standing to bring preemption 
claims against Texas laws defining residency for the purposes of in-state 
tuition rates.132  Similar to the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Day, the Southern 
 
 123. See id. at 1034. 
 124. See id. at 1037–38, 1038 n.8. 
 125. See id. at 1039. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id.; see also Denise Oas, Immigration and Higher Education:  The Debate Over 
In-State Tuition, 79 UMKC L. REV. 877, 890–92 (2011) (discussing Mannschreck v. Bd. of 
Regents, No. Ci10-8 (D. Neb. filed Jan. 25, 2010), dismissed sub nom. Mannschreck v. 
Clare, No. Ci10-8 (D. Neb. Dec. 17, 2010), where the district court held that resident 
property owners lacked standing to bring preemption claims against the state statute granting 
in-state tuition rates to undocumented students). 
 128. 706 F. Supp. 2d 760, 762 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
 129. See id. at 762–63. 
 130. See id. at 763. 
 131. See id. at 764–65. 
 132. See id. at 765. 
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District of Texas held that IRCOT alleged no concrete injury-in-fact 
resulting from the Texas residency statutes granting undocumented students 
in-state tuition rates.133  Thus, because the court found that IRCOT lacked 
standing in federal court, the case was remanded to the state court where it 
originated.134 
Indeed, standing is more permissive in state court, as demonstrated in 
Martinez.135  The Martinez plaintiffs brought a preemption claim in state 
court against section 68130.5 of the California Education Code,136 which 
was enacted in 2001.137  The plaintiffs, who were U.S. citizens paying 
nonresident tuition rates at California public colleges and universities, filed 
a class action lawsuit against the various governing bodies and officials of 
California’s public postsecondary institutions.138  From the start of the 
litigation, the California Superior Court held that the plaintiffs’ allegation 
that section 68130.5 infringed on their constitutional and statutory rights 
was sufficient to establish standing to bring a challenge in state court.139  
Moreover, the court held that a private right of action did not need to exist 
in § 1621 and § 1623 for the plaintiffs to have standing to bring a 
preemption challenge.140  Thus, as § 1621 and § 1623 were intended to 
cover the treatment of undocumented immigrants, U.S. citizen plaintiffs had 
standing in state court to bring a preemption challenge because section 
68130.5 gave undocumented immigrants the right to postsecondary 
education benefits.141  The defendants did not challenge the Superior 
Court’s holding on the plaintiffs’ standing on appeal.142 
Thus, from the limited case law that exists, it appears that plaintiffs 
challenging state laws granting in-state tuition rates to undocumented 
students must bring their cases in state court, as they will not have standing 
to bring their challenges in federal court. 
F.  Federal Preemption of Laws Relating to Undocumented Immigrants 
With standing issues allowing the federal courts to avoid deciding issues 
of preemption concerning § 1623, the conflict over whether state laws 
granting in-state tuition benefits to undocumented students are preempted 
by federal law remains an undecided issue.  In order to lay a basis for 
understanding how preemption doctrine should apply to state laws granting 
in-state tuition benefits to undocumented students, this section discusses 
 
 133. See id. 
 134. See id. 
 135. 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010). 
 136. See id. at 859–60. 
 137. A.B. 540, 2001–2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001). 
 138. See 241 P.3d at 860. 
 139. See Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. CV 05-2064, 2006 WL 2974303, 
at *5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2006). 
 140. See id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 518, 527 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2008). 
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preemption doctrine generally, and explores two cases of the Supreme 
Court’s application of preemption to state laws affecting aliens in the 
United States. 
1.  Preemption Doctrine Generally 
The doctrine of preemption is based in Article VI of the Constitution, 
which states that the laws and treaties of the United States “shall be the 
supreme law of the land . . . anything in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the contrary notwithstanding.”143  Pure immigration law, defined as 
that which relates to “the entry and expulsion of noncitizens and the 
conditions under which they may remain,”144 is the exclusive domain of the 
federal government.145  Thus, state laws that relate to noncitizens may face 
preemption challenges, since “[d]omesticating immigration law . . . 
alienates . . . the notion that the Constitution imbues only Congress with 
power to conduct foreign affairs.”146  The preemption of state laws turns on 
the question of congressional intent, for while “Congress clearly can 
preempt state law, federal law can also be ‘supreme’ without state law 
being contrary to it, if the federal authority decides that it wants to permit 
state laws to continue to operate notwithstanding the federal law.”147  
Where there are state laws concerning noncitizens and the regulation of 
domestic issues, the three possible bases for preemption are:  express 
preemption, implied preemption in the form of field preemption, or conflict 
preemption.148 
Express preemption applies where a statute clearly indicates what state 
laws it intends to preempt in an express preemption provision.149  Congress 
can also clarify the issue of whether there is express preemption by 
including a savings clause that indicates what state laws it does not intend 
to preempt.150  It is challenging, however, for Congress to craft a savings 
clause that anticipates the full impact a statute will have on state laws, thus 
making it difficult to ascertain Congress’s full intent with certain 
statutes.151  In such cases, the Supreme Court applies a canon of statutory 
interpretation that recognizes a presumption against preemption to preserve 
the values of federalism and respect for state laws.152  This presumption 
 
 143. U.S. CONST. art. VI; Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine, 
in PREEMPTION CHOICE:  THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 
119, 119 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009). 
 144. Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion:  The Rise of State and Local Power Over 
Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1600–01 (2008). 
 145. See supra Part I.A. 
 146. Stumpf, supra note 144, at 1601. 
 147. Schroeder, supra note 143, at 120. 
 148. See Stumpf, supra note 144, at 1601–02. 
 149. See Schroeder, supra note 143, at 121. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See id. at 122. 
 152. See id. at 122–23 (citing N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995)). 
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remains particularly strong when the state law in question is one that is in 
the realm of the states’ traditional powers to protect public health, safety, 
and morals.153  Courts therefore tend to read federal statutes narrowly and 
look for a clear statement that Congress intended to override state law.154 
In cases in which the statute contains no express preemption or savings 
clause, the question becomes whether Congress has preempted state law by 
implication.155  In an analysis for implied preemption, the touchstone 
question is one of congressional intent.156  While it may be difficult to keep 
the two categories of implied preemption distinct, implied preemption can 
take the form of field preemption or conflict preemption.157 
Field preemption applies where the “scheme of federal regulation [is] so 
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room 
for the States to supplement it.”158  Within these exclusively federal fields 
of regulation, state laws would be preempted even if they are not in conflict 
with federal laws.159  Defining the “field” that is to be preempted can 
depend on the pervasiveness of a federal statute in its regulation of an area, 
as a more comprehensive regulatory scheme indicates that Congress likely 
did not intend “to leave holes in its regulations to be filled in by the 
states.”160  Courts have also found field preemption where there are federal 
statutes regulating an area with such a dominating federal interest that the 
preclusion of state laws is assumed.161 
Conflict preemption applies “when ‘compliance with both federal and 
state regulation is a physical impossibility,’ or where state law ‘stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.’”162  Physical impossibility cases demonstrate clear 
implied preemption of state laws, as Congress would not enact a law with 
the intent that states could prohibit what federal law requires.163  The 
analysis for conflict preemption becomes more challenging, however, when 
determining whether a state law “stands as an obstacle” to the objectives of 
 
 153. See Schroeder, supra note 143, at 123 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 
485 (1996)). 
 154. See id. 
 155. See id. at 124. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See id. at 125. 
 158. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 
190, 204 (1983) (citations omitted). 
 159. See Schroeder, supra note 143, at 125–26. 
 160. Id. at 127. 
 161. See id. at 128 (citing Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 503 (1956)).  As an 
example, the Supreme Court struck down a state statute imposing sanctions that 
supplemented those implemented by the federal government against a foreign nation, as the 
federal government occupies the field of foreign affairs. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade 
Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
 162. Pac. Gas, 461 U.S. at 204 (citations omitted) (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado 
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963), and Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 
67 (1941)). 
 163. See Schroeder, supra note 143, at 131. 
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a federal law.164  This obstacle test for preemption appears to rest on 
whether the state law would impede the full achievement of Congress’s 
purposes and objectives in enacting its statute.165 
2.  Preemption As Applied in the Immigration Context:  De Canas v. Bica 
As immigration regulation is understood to be a federal power, the 
Supreme Court has faced challenges in applying preemption doctrine to 
various state laws affecting aliens.166  In 1976, the Court clarified the extent 
to which states have the right to regulate matters concerning unauthorized 
immigrants in De Canas v. Bica.167  Lawfully admitted migrant 
farmworkers challenged a provision of the California Labor Code that 
prohibited an employer from knowingly employing an alien without lawful 
residence status if such employment would have an adverse effect on lawful 
resident workers.168  The Court held that this provision was not 
unconstitutional as a regulation of immigration or preempted by federal 
immigration law, and the sole fact that aliens were the subject of the state 
statute did not render it a regulation of immigration.169 
The challenged provision did not touch issues involving determinations 
of who should or should not be admitted into the country, nor did it address 
the conditions under which an immigrant may remain.170  Rather, it 
reflected California’s use of its state powers to protect workers within the 
state.171  The Court held that federal regulation should not be considered 
preemptive of state regulatory power unless the nature of the regulated 
subject matter so clearly indicates that its regulatory authority rests within 
the federal government, or that Congress has unmistakably legislated the 
power to the federal government.172 
3.  Preemption Regarding Higher Education for Nonimmigrant Aliens 
Six years later, in Toll v. Moreno,173 the Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of a state’s denial of in-state tuition to nonimmigrants, 
 
 164. Id. at 132–33 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67). 
 165. See id. at 133. 
 166. See Schroeder, supra note 143, at 129–30 (describing the Supreme Court’s holdings 
that federal law preempted a state law interfering with federal alien registration 
requirements, Hines, 312 U.S. 52, as well as a state law denying commercial fishing licenses 
to aliens ineligible for citizenship, Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), 
but did not preempt a state law prohibiting undocumented aliens from employment that 
would affect resident workers, De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976)). 
 167. 424 U.S. 351 (1976) 
 168. See id. at 353; see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805, repealed by 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 946, 
§ 1. 
 169. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355.  Legislation with a “purely speculative and indirect 
impact on immigration” does not render it an unconstitutional regulation of immigration. Id. 
at 355–56. 
 170. See id. at 355. 
 171. See id. at 356–57. 
 172. See id. at 356. 
 173. 458 U.S. 1 (1982). 
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though not in the context of undocumented immigrants.  The plaintiffs in 
Toll challenged a University of Maryland policy that denied treaty 
organization (G-4) aliens in-state tuition pursuant to the University’s policy 
of excluding all nonimmigrant aliens from obtaining in-state status even 
upon a showing of domicile within the state.174  The plaintiffs contended 
that the University’s policy violated various federal laws, as well as 
constitutional provisions, including the Supremacy Clause.175  Under a 
Supremacy Clause analysis, the Court reiterated that states “can neither add 
to nor take from the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon 
admission, naturalization and residence of aliens in the United States or the 
several states.”176  This echoed the Court’s reasoning in De Canas,177 and 
the Court held that because Congress made the explicit decision to not bar 
G-4 aliens from acquiring domicile, the University’s policy of denying in-
state status to G-4 aliens solely on the basis of their nonimmigrant status 
violated the Supremacy Clause by imposing an “ancillary burden not 
contemplated by Congress in admitting these aliens” to reside in the United 
States.178 
II.  ARE STATE LAWS PROVIDING POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION BENEFITS 
TO UNDOCUMENTED STUDENTS IN THE FORM OF IN-STATE TUITION RATES 
PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW? 
As the issue of whether federal law preempts state legislation granting in-
state tuition benefits to undocumented students has not yet been decided by 
a federal court, the arguments for and against preemption have been voiced 
strongly throughout the several cases challenging such state legislation and 
in the ongoing debates over immigration reform. Part II.A explores the 
arguments for and against preemption presented in legal scholarship over 
state laws providing in-state tuition benefits to undocumented students.  
Part II.B examines those arguments made specifically in Day, and Part II.C 
looks at those presented in Martinez. 
A.  Preemption Arguments Made In Legal Scholarship 
The arguments made by the leading legal scholars on postsecondary 
education benefits for undocumented students are discussed below.  This 
section first presents the arguments against the preemption of state laws 
providing in-state tuition benefits for undocumented students.  It then 
presents the arguments in favor of preemption. 
 
 174. See id. at 3–4. 
 175. See id. at 4. 
 176. Id. at 11 (quoting Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948)). 
 177. See id. at 12–13 (“[S]tate regulation not congressionally sanctioned that 
discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to the country is impermissible if it imposes 
additional burdens not contemplated by Congress.” (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 
351, 358 n.6 (1976))). 
 178. Id. at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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1.  Arguments Against Preemption 
Supporters of state statutes providing in-state tuition rate benefits to 
undocumented students interpret § 1621 and § 1623 to allow states to 
provide undocumented residents with a residency benefit in their public 
postsecondary institutions.179  Regarding § 1623, Professor Michael Olivas 
argues that state residency is a status to be determined by the states, and that 
Congress has no authority to regulate the benefits that states give to their 
residents.180 
Olivas also argues that states have the right to provide such immigrants 
with education benefits because Congress used the word “unless” in 
§ 1623.181  The “unless” establishes a condition precedent that a state 
cannot give any more consideration to an undocumented student than it can 
to a nonresident student from another state.182  A state is therefore allowed 
to provide postsecondary education benefits as long as it treats in-state 
undocumented immigrants in the same way it treats out-of-state U.S. 
citizens.  The presence of this condition precedent serves to establish that 
states are allowed to enact measures that provide undocumented students 
with postsecondary education benefits, because “[a] flat bar [against such 
provisions] would not include such a modifier.”183 
Lastly, Professor Olivas argues that § 1623 only prohibits providing 
monetary benefits, as is indicated by the statute’s use of the words “amount, 
duration, and scope” to describe the benefits prohibited.184  As the direct 
benefit conferred by state legislation providing undocumented students with 
access to in-state tuition rates is not a direct monetary benefit, but the right 
to be considered for in-state residency status for the purposes of tuition and 
fees, it does not fall under the scope of § 1623’s prohibited benefits.185  
This interpretation is further supported by the fact that Congress has 
enacted a separate program to limit the availability of monetary 
postsecondary education benefits in the form of federal financial aid.186 
An additional argument offered by in-state tuition proponents is that 
because most state legislation granting in-state tuition to undocumented 
 
 179. See Michael A. Olivas, IIRIRA, the DREAM Act, and Undocumented College 
Student Residency, 30 J.C. & U.L. 435, 453–54 (2004). 
 180. See id. at 453. 
 181. See id.; cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1623 (2006) (“[A]n alien who is not lawfully present in the 
United States shall not be eligible on the basis of residence within a State . . . for any 
postsecondary education benefit unless a citizen or national of the United States is eligible 
for such a benefit . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 182. See Olivas, supra note 179, at 453 (“The only way to read this convoluted language 
is:  State A cannot give any more consideration to an undocumented student than it can give 
to a nonresident student from State B. For example, California could not enact a plan to 
extend resident status to undocumented students after they had resided in the state for twelve 
months, and then accord that same status to U.S. citizens or permanent residents from 
Nevada or Oregon after eighteen months.”). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 454. 
 185. See id. 
 186. See id. 
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students does not hinge eligibility upon residence, but upon other criteria—
such as graduation from a high school in the state—such legislation is not in 
violation of § 1623.187 
2.  Arguments for Preemption 
Those who find state provision of in-state tuition rates to undocumented 
students to be unconstitutional maintain that the states who do so 
“flagrantly violate federal immigration laws,”188 namely § 1623.189  In 
addition to making public policy arguments against allowing in-state tuition 
rates for undocumented students,190 Professor Kris Kobach argues that such 
state legislation is expressly and impliedly preempted by federal law.191  
Professor Kobach argues that § 1623 expressly prohibits offering in-state 
tuition rates to undocumented students unless all U.S. citizens receive such 
rates, thus reflecting Congress’s intent to prohibit states from offering in-
state tuition rates to undocumented students “by making it impossibly 
expensive to do so.”192  Supported by the principle that “the purpose of 
Congress is the ultimate touchstone” of preemption analysis,193 Professor 
Kobach referred to the Committee Reports on IIRIRA section 505 to 
demonstrate Congress’s intent to enact the law to prevent undocumented 
students from receiving in-state tuition rates.194  In addition, a holistic view 
of IIRIRA and Congress’s manifest intent in enacting the law to discourage 
illegal immigration requires interpreting § 1623 as prohibiting in-state 
tuition rates for undocumented students in order to be consistent with 
IIRIRA’s purpose.195 
Professor Kobach also finds state legislation providing in-state tuition 
rates to undocumented students impliedly preempted under a De Canas 
analysis.196  Pursuant to De Canas, any state law conflicting with 
congressional objectives is impliedly preempted by federal law.197  
Following this analysis, Professor Kobach proffers three reasons why 
federal laws preempt state legislation providing in-state tuition rates to 
 
 187. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 15, at 1211. 
 188. Kris W. Kobach, Immigration Nullification:  In-State Tuition and Lawmakers Who 
Disregard the Law, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 473, 475 (2007).  Professor Kobach 
served as Plaintiffs’ counsel in both Day v. Bond, 511 F.3d 1030 (10th Cir. 2007), and 
Martinez v. Regents of the University of California, 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010). 
 189. See Kobach, supra note 188, at 477. 
 190. See id. at 498–503 (arguing that laws granting in-state tuition rates for 
undocumented students are poor public policy because, inter alia, they give a significant 
financial benefit to aliens who are in violation of federal law while denying the same 
benefits to U.S. citizens who are from out of state, and allowing such rates rewards illegal 
behavior). 
 191. See id. at 475. 
 192. Id. at 507–08. 
 193. Id. at 508 (citing Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)). 
 194. See Kobach, supra note 188, at 508–09. 
 195. See id. at 511. 
 196. See id. at 514. 
 197. See supra notes 167–72 and accompanying text. 
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undocumented students.198  First, such legislation conflicts with the 
government’s interest in removing the availability of public benefits as an 
incentive for illegal immigration.199  Second, such legislation acts as an 
obstacle to the enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
by encouraging students to remain in their undocumented status, as many 
state statutes are constructed so as to take away the benefit of in-state 
tuition rates if undocumented students were to obtain student visas to be in 
compliance with the federal law.200  Lastly, the state statutes 
unconstitutionally use terms to describe students’ immigration statuses that 
are inconsistent with the terminology of federal immigration law.201  State 
officials go beyond their powers in using such terms by unconstitutionally 
making determinations that are inconsistent with federal law about who is 
entitled to be considered lawfully present in the United States.202 
Those opposed to providing undocumented students with in-state tuition 
benefits therefore find that state legislation doing so is inconsistent with 
congressional intent to exclude unlawfully present aliens from 
postsecondary education benefits.203  In addition, they argue that § 1621 
prohibits residency reclassification for the purposes of providing 
undocumented students with in-state tuition rates.204  In response, Professor 
Olivas points out that residency reclassification is not listed within the state 
or local public benefits enumerated in § 1621(c).205 
B.  Kansas:  Day v. Bond 
The arguments of Professors Olivas and Kobach have been made by 
parties in cases such as Day.206  As discussed above, the case was 
ultimately decided on standing grounds, and neither the district court nor 
the Tenth Circuit ever fully addressed the preemption issue.207  In addition, 
 
 198. See id. 
 199. See id. at 515. 
 200. See id. (explaining that California law is constructed so as to “exclude[] any alien 
holding a nonimmigrant visa. . . .  Moreover, [an undocumented student] must continue to 
remain in the United States and attend university in violation of federal law in order to 
receive [in-state tuition rates].  If such an alien leaves the United States, as required by 
federal law, he loses eligibility for the benefit.  On the other hand, if he obtains a student visa 
to attend college in compliance with federal law, he loses eligibility for the benefit.”). 
 201. See id. at 516. 
 202. See id. 
 203. See Memorandum from Alison P. Landry, Assistant Att’y Gen., Va., to INS 
Designated Sch. Officials & the Exec. Dir. of the State Council for Higher Educ. in Va. 6–7 
(Sept. 5, 2002), available at http://www.schev.edu/AdminFaculty/ImmigrationMemo9-5-
02APL.pdf (providing immigration law compliance update). 
 204. See Olivas, supra note 179, at 454. 
 205. See id. 
 206. 500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 207. See Day v. Sebelius, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1039 (D. Kan. 2005) (dismissing 
Plaintiffs’ equal protection claims for lack of standing, as Plaintiffs were unable to establish 
any injury caused by K.S.A. 76-731a since they would have to pay out-of-state tuition 
regardless of whether K.S.A. 76-731a was in effect); see also Day v. Bond, 511 F.3d 1030, 
1032 (10th Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court’s decision, holding that “[t]he only form 
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the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari in June 2008.208  
However, throughout the course of the litigation, the parties raised the basic 
preemption arguments concerning § 1623. 
1.  Arguments That K.S.A. 76-731a Is Preempted by 8 U.S.C. § 1623 
The plaintiffs first argued that § 1623 expressly preempts K.S.A. 76-
731a, as § 1623’s plain language requires in-state tuition rates to be offered 
to U.S. citizens without regard to their residence if such rates are offered to 
undocumented students.209  This argument rested upon an interpretation of 
§ 1623 that requires all nonresident U.S. citizens to be entitled to the same 
benefits as undocumented residents.210  Such an interpretation would be 
consistent with Congress’s efforts to deter illegal immigration by enacting 
§ 1623,211 and to prevent the states from undermining the enforcement of 
federal immigration laws by providing benefits to undocumented 
immigrants unlawfully present in the United States.212  The plaintiffs 
argued that the title itself of K.S.A. 76-731a—“Certain persons without 
lawful immigration status deemed residents for the purpose of tuition and 
fees”213—facially violates § 1623 because it extends the in-state tuition 
benefit to only undocumented immigrants and excludes U.S. citizens.214  In 
addition, the plaintiffs emphasized that because residency laws of the states 
operate so that every U.S. citizen is a resident of some state,215 every out-
of-state U.S. citizen is disqualified for the in-state tuition benefit based on 
K.S.A. 76-731a(c)(2)’s requirement that a person not be eligible for in-state 
tuition in another state.216  By interpreting § 1623 as an “equal protection” 
statute for U.S. citizens seeking favorable tuition rates at public universities 
located outside their state of residence, the plaintiffs maintained that § 1623 
requires U.S. citizens to be placed on “equal footing” with undocumented 
students.217  Following such reasoning, K.S.A. 76-731a unlawfully treats 
undocumented immigrants more favorably than citizens in violation of 
 
of injury that the Plaintiffs assert in support of their standing to make this preemption claim 
is the invasion of a putative statutory right conferred on them by . . . § 1623.” (quoting Day, 
500 F.3d at 1136) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 208. See Day v. Bond, 554 U.S. 918, 918 (2008). 
 209. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6–7, Day, 554 U.S. 918 (No. 07-1193) 
[hereinafter Day Cert. Petition]. 
 210. See id. at 7. 
 211. Amici Curiae Brief of the Honorable Alan K. Simpson et al. in Support of 
Petitioners at 7, Day, 554 U.S. 918 (No. 07-1193) [hereinafter Judge Simpson Brief]. 
 212. See Day Cert. Petition, supra note 209, at 7. 
 213. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-731a (2011). 
 214. See Day Cert. Petition, supra note 209, at 8. 
 215. See Reply Brief of Petitioners at 11, Day, 554 U.S. 918 (No. 07-1193) [hereinafter 
Day Petitioners’ Reply Brief]. 
 216. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-731a(c)(2) (“The provisions of this section shall not apply 
to any individual who . . . at the time of enrollment, is eligible to enroll in a public 
postsecondary educational institution located in another state upon payment of fees and 
tuition required of residents of such state.”). 
 217. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation et al. As Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 21, Day, 554 U.S. 918 (No. 07-1193). 
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§ 1623, as an undocumented immigrant cannot be disqualified by the 
requirement of ineligibility for resident tuition in another state because he is 
ineligible to acquire legal residence in any state.218 
The plaintiffs also argued for the implied preemption of K.S.A. 76-731a, 
as upholding the state statute would render § 1623 “a dead letter” and defeat 
the intent of Congress.219  The plaintiffs maintained that Congress’s intent 
in enacting § 1623 was to allow U.S. citizen students to have the same 
rights to any educational benefits offered to undocumented students.220  In 
support of this proposition was the argument that Congress’s multiple failed 
attempts to pass the DREAM Act, which would have repealed § 1623 and 
granted undocumented students with postsecondary education benefits, 
reflected Congress’s recognition of its intent behind § 1623 to ban state 
legislation that granted such benefits.221  However, contrary to this intent, 
K.S.A. 76-731a unlawfully allows undocumented students to receive 
reduced in-state tuition at taxpayer-funded state colleges.222 
2.  Arguments That K.S.A. 76-731a Is Not Preempted by 8 U.S.C. § 1623 
The defendants argued that K.S.A. 76-731a is not preempted, because 
pursuant to § 1621 and § 1623, the in-state tuition benefits are available to 
any individual who meets the conditions of K.S.A. 76-731.223  The district 
court’s finding that most of those students who have been able to take 
advantage of K.S.A. 76-731a are not undocumented immigrant students, but 
U.S. citizens who were not residents of Kansas,224 supported the 
defendants’ argument that K.S.A. 76-731a does not violate § 1623 because 
its in-state tuition benefit is not limited to undocumented immigrants.  
Moreover, the defendants argued that K.S.A. 76-731a also adheres to 
§ 1621(d) by affirmatively stating Kansas’s intent to make undocumented 
students among its beneficiaries.225 
C.  California:  Martinez v. Regents of the University of California 
While K.S.A. 76-731a explicitly states that undocumented students are 
eligible for in-state tuition rates as residents of Kansas for the purposes of 
tuition and fees, section 68130.5 of the California Education Code does not 
 
 218. See Day Petitioners’ Reply Brief, supra note 215, at 11. 
 219. Day Cert. Petition, supra note 209, at 34–36. 
 220. See id. at 35. 
 221. See Judge Simpson Brief, supra note 211, at 7. 
 222. See Day Cert. Petition, supra note 209, at 35. 
 223. See Brief in Opposition 4–5, Day, 554 U.S. 918 (No. 07-1193) [hereinafter Day 
Respondents’ Brief].  The conditions as set forth in K.S.A. 76-731 are:  attending Kansas 
high school for at least three years; graduating from a Kansas high school or obtaining a 
Kansas GED; signing an affidavit regarding the legalization of the student’s immigration 
status; not holding a valid student visa; and ineligibility for resident tuition at any other 
state’s postsecondary schools. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-731a (2011). 
 224. See Day v. Sebelius, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1033 (D. Kan. 2005). 
 225. See Day Respondents’ Brief, supra note 223, at 5; see also supra note 87 and 
accompanying text. 
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make such express statements about being considered a resident for tuition 
purposes.226  It simply bases an undocumented student’s eligibility on 
meeting the requirements of attending a California high school for three or 
more years; graduating from a California high school; enrolling at a 
California public college or university; and, in the case of a student without 
lawful immigration status, filing an affidavit with the institution of higher 
education stating that the student has filed or will file an application to 
legalize his or her immigration status.227 
The central issue in the Martinez revolved around whether § 1623 should 
be interpreted as barring state laws that grant in-state tuition literally “on 
the basis of residence,” or whether “on the basis of residence” is merely a 
term used to describe the kinds of benefits typically given on the basis of 
residence, which Congress sought to bar.228  In the latter case, section 
68130.5 would be preempted by federal law from granting in-state tuition 
benefits to undocumented students, even if eligibility is based on factors not 
explicitly residence-based, such as an undocumented student’s attendance at 
and graduation from a California high school. 
1.  Arguments That Section 68130.5 of the California Education Code Is 
Preempted by 8 U.S.C. § 1623 
The Martinez plaintiffs argued that section 68130.5 is expressly 
preempted by § 1623, as Congress intended § 1623 to prevent states from 
providing in-state tuition rates as a resident benefit to undocumented 
immigrants.229  The plaintiffs argued that section 68130.5 violates § 1623 
by conferring a benefit on the basis of “de facto residence 
requirement[s]”230 without giving the same benefit to every U.S. citizen.231  
The plaintiffs maintained that the graduation requirement is a de facto 
residence requirement, because “[a] reasonable person would assume that a 
person attending a California high school for three years also lives in 
California.  Such an assumption would be reasonable, given that a school 
district is generally linked to residence.”232  In addition, the three-year 
California high school attendance requirement similarly created a 
“surrogate criterion for residence.”233 
The plaintiffs relied heavily on the legislative history behind § 1623 to 
argue for express preemption, as legislative intent can inform statutory 
 
 226. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 227. See id. 
 228. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 
131 S. Ct. 2961 (2011) (No. 10-1029) [hereinafter Martinez Cert. Petition]. 
 229. See id. at 17. 
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2008). 
 231. See Martinez Cert. Petition, supra note 228, at 11. 
 232. Martinez, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 535. 
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interpretation where a statute is unclear.234  Because § 1623 was enacted as 
a part of IIRIRA, the plaintiffs emphasized that IIRIRA was enacted to 
preclude undocumented immigrants from public benefits, including 
postsecondary education benefits.235  Moreover, this legislation came six 
weeks after PRWORA was enacted for the purpose of removing the 
incentive for illegal immigration provided by the availability of public 
benefits.236  Congress’s intent behind PRWORA and IIRIRA support the 
idea that it sought to make it practically impossible for states to grant in-
state tuition to undocumented students.237  In fact, the Congressional 
Committee Report describes IIRIRA section 505 as “provid[ing] that illegal 
aliens are not eligible for in-state tuition rates at public institutions of higher 
education.”238  Statements from members of Congress reflect their support 
for IIRIRA section 505 as a measure to deny undocumented immigrants in-
state tuition.239 
The preemption of section 68130.5 is further supported by the argument 
that the California state legislature cannot evade or circumvent § 1623 
preemption by making the in-state tuition benefit available to only some 
and not all U.S. citizens without regard to their state of residence.240  
According to the Martinez plaintiffs, section 68130.5 unlawfully excludes 
the “vast majority” of nonresident U.S. citizens who do not attend or 
graduate from a California high school, and thus do not qualify for reduced 
tuition.241  The plaintiffs also argued that Congress did not intend to create 
a “loophole” that would allow states to play “semantic games” and avoid 
granting undocumented students residence-based benefits by using 
“surrogate criterion,” such as graduation from a state high school.242  The 
plaintiffs additionally argued that section 68130.5 is preempted by § 1621, 
which expressly prohibits public benefits for illegal aliens unless a state 
enacts a statute affirmatively providing eligibility for undocumented 
immigrants.243 
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As the plaintiffs’ express preemption argument was based primarily upon 
congressional intent, rather than any express provisions of federal law, they 
also argued that the lack of express preemption does not mean that implied 
preemption does not exist.244  In arguing for field preemption, the plaintiffs 
asserted that Congress manifested its clear purpose to oust state power in 
the field of regulating postsecondary education benefits available to 
undocumented students.245  The plaintiffs’ field preemption argument 
rested upon the idea that by enacting § 1623, “Congress . . . expressly 
limited the state’s power to give in-state tuition to illegal aliens, and in that 
sense Congress manifested a clear purpose to oust state power with respect 
to the subject matter which the state statute attempts to regulate.”246  
Therefore, while § 1623 does not contain express preemption language, it 
impliedly bars section 68130.5 because among its objectives is prohibiting 
undocumented immigrants from receiving postsecondary education 
benefits.247 
The plaintiffs also made a conflict preemption argument, stating that 
section 68130.5 stands as an obstacle to Congress’s goal of removing the 
incentives for illegal immigration.248  It would be impossible for 
undocumented immigrants to take advantage of section 68130.5 and be in 
compliance with federal law, as resident tuition rates for undocumented 
students would encourage them to remain unlawfully in the United States, 
thus conflicting with the anti-illegal immigration objective of § 1623.249  In 
addition, it would be impossible for the defendant state university officials 
to comply with both section 68130.5 and § 1623, because section 68130.5 
grants the in-state tuition benefit to nonresident U.S.citizens only if they 
attended a California high school for three years, and thus does not afford 
the same benefit to all citizens without regard to residence as required by 
§ 1623.250 
2.  Arguments That Section 68130.5 of the California Education Code Is 
Not Preempted by 8 U.S.C. § 1623 
While the California Superior Court initially ruled for the defendants on 
the preemption issue, holding that neither § 1621 nor § 1623 preempted 
section 68130.5,251 on appeal in 2008, the California Court of Appeal 
reversed, holding that § 1621 and § 1623 preempted section 68130.5.252  
However, the Supreme Court of California reversed the Court of Appeal’s 
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decision in 2010, holding that section 68130.5 is not preempted by § 1621 
and § 1623.253  The arguments that exist against section 68130.5 
preemption were strongly voiced in the California Supreme Court’s 
decision. 
Addressing the plaintiffs’ express preemption arguments, which had 
emphasized Congress’s legislative intent behind § 1623, the court 
emphasized that the plain statutory language of § 1623 is controlling in its 
interpretation.254  Such unambiguous language cannot be negated by 
legislative history.255  Thus, the legislative history behind § 1623, which 
contains only remarks by a few members of Congress, cannot negate the 
plain language of the statute, particularly where the remarks portray § 1623 
as something other than that which is conveyed in its plain and 
unambiguous text.256 
Following such a principle of statutory interpretation, the California 
Supreme Court held that section 68130.5 is not expressly preempted by 
§ 1623.257  The plain text of § 1623 shows that Congress did not enact an 
absolute bar against providing undocumented immigrants with in-state 
tuition rates; rather, § 1623 was drafted as a conditional and qualified 
prohibition.258  Congress’s inclusion of the phrase “on the basis of 
residence” serves as a limit on the reach of § 1623’s prohibition on 
providing benefits to undocumented immigrants.259  Had Congress intended 
to create an absolute ban on postsecondary education benefits for 
undocumented immigrants, it could have easily crafted § 1623 to be one.260  
Thus, to read the statute as an absolute bar would render “on the basis of 
residence”  superfluous.261 
The court held that section 68130.5 does not confer eligibility on the 
basis of residence, but bases eligibility on other criteria,262 such as having 
attended high school in California for at least three years and having 
graduated from a California high school.263  Such criteria cannot be 
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considered “de facto” residence criteria due to the fact that there are several 
categories of nonresident students who are not undocumented immigrants 
also qualifying for in-state tuition rates.264  For example, students living in 
an adjoining state or country who are permitted to attend high school in 
California; the children of parents living outside California, who attend 
boarding schools or high schools in California; and those who attended high 
school in California for three years, but moved out of the state and lost 
residency status, but decide to attend a California public college or 
university are all eligible for in-state tuition rates under section 68130.5.265 
The court also held that there was no implied preemption of section 
68130.5.266  In rejecting the plaintiffs’ field preemption argument, the court 
recognized that immigration power is within the exclusive realm of the 
federal government, but that not all state legislation affecting noncitizens is 
preempted by federal law.267 
In deciding Martinez, the court determined that, through § 1621 and 
§ 1623, Congress defined the reach of federal preemption of state 
legislation.268  Those arguing against the preemption of section 68130.5 
maintain that § 1623 does not require all U.S. citizens to receive the same 
benefits as those granted to undocumented immigrants; it only requires that 
citizens also be given the opportunity to be considered for such a benefit.269  
The court found that requiring the benefits to extend to all U.S. citizens 
would be an oversimplification of the statutory language of § 1623.270 
Moreover, the defendants asserted that section 68130.5 is not preempted 
because § 1621(d) expressly authorizes states to provide public benefits for 
undocumented immigrants if it does so in compliance with § 1621(d)’s 
requirements,271 which include affirmatively providing undocumented 
immigrants with eligibility for in-state tuition benefits.272  The fact that 
such express authorization exists in the federal law therefore shows that 
Congress did not intend to fully occupy the field regulating benefits to 
undocumented immigrants.273  In compliance with § 1621(d), the California 
state legislature enacted section 68130.5 by affirmatively stating that “[t]his 
act . . . allows all persons, including undocumented immigrant students who 
meet the requirements . . . to be exempt from non-resident tuition in 
California’s colleges and universities.”274  Therefore, section 68130.5 does 
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not fall within the scope of preemption by federal law because it complies 
with the conditions set forth in both § 1621 and § 1623.275 
In accordance with these arguments, the California Supreme Court held 
there was no preemption of section 68130.5.276  However, because the U.S. 
Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari for Martinez in June 
2011,277 the issue of whether state legislation providing in-state tuition 
benefits to undocumented students is preempted by federal immigration law 
remains an undecided question. 
III.  STATES CAN PROPERLY CRAFT LEGISLATION GRANTING 
UNDOCUMENTED STUDENTS IN-STATE TUITION RATES IN 
COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL LAW 
Strong arguments exist on both sides of the debate over whether federal 
law preempts states from passing legislation that provides postsecondary 
education benefits in the form of in-state tuition rates to undocumented 
students.  Part III of this Note argues, however, that proper statutory 
interpretation of § 1621 and § 1623 and standard preemption analysis 
indicate that states can provide in-state tuition rates to undocumented 
students.  Properly crafted legislation does not face express preemption, 
field preemption, or conflict preemption by § 1623, as discussed in Parts 
III.A, III.B, and III.C, respectively.  Nonetheless, while the states are able to 
provide in-state tuition rates to undocumented students, Part III.D argues 
that the best solution to resolving the conflicting views on in-state tuition 
rates for undocumented students would be through federal legislation 
repealing § 1623 and granting deserving undocumented students a pathway 
to lawful immigration status and higher education. 
A.  In-State Tuition Rates for Undocumented Students Are Not Expressly 
Preempted by § 1623 
Section 1623 states that “an alien who is not lawfully present in the 
United States shall not be eligible on the basis of residence within a State 
. . . for any postsecondary education benefit unless a citizen or national of 
the United States is eligible for such a benefit . . . .”278  Thus, the statute 
sets forth two conditions to be met by states legislating to provide in-state 
tuition rates for undocumented students:  first, the benefit cannot be based 
on residence within a state;279 and second, nonresident citizens must not be 
any less entitled to the benefit than undocumented students.280  State 
legislation that meets these two requirements is therefore not expressly 
preempted by § 1623.281 
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Moreover, § 1623 cannot be viewed as an absolute bar against providing 
undocumented students with postsecondary education benefits.  The 
legislative history behind § 1623, which contains only a few congressional 
remarks to indicate an intent to create a blanket prohibition against 
postsecondary education benefits, cannot negate the plain and unambiguous 
language of the statute.282  Section 1623 was drafted as a conditional and 
qualified prohibition, not an absolute one.283  Congress’s use of the phrase 
“on the basis of residence” serves as a limit on the reach of § 1623’s 
prohibition on providing benefits to undocumented immigrants,284 and to 
read the statute as an absolute bar would render “on the basis of residence” 
meaningless surplus language in the statute.285  Had Congress intended to 
create an absolute ban on postsecondary education benefits for 
undocumented immigrants, it could have easily crafted § 1623 to be one.286 
Furthermore, the condition established by the “unless” in the statutory 
language further supports a conclusion that states can offer in-state tuition 
benefits to undocumented students.287  The “unless” establishes the 
condition that a state cannot give any more consideration to an 
undocumented student than it can to a nonresident student from another 
state.288  This condition further proves that states are allowed to enact 
measures that provide undocumented students with postsecondary 
education benefits, as such a modifier would not be necessary had Congress 
intended to enact a flat bar against providing postsecondary education 
benefits.289 
As most state legislation granting in-state tuition to undocumented 
students does not rest eligibility upon residence within a state, but upon 
other criteria, such as graduation from a high school within the state, such 
legislation is not in violation of § 1623.290  For example, K.S.A. 76-731a is 
not preempted by § 1623 because the in-state tuition benefits are available 
to any individuals—not just undocumented students—who meet the 
conditions of the statute, which are not expressly based upon residence.291 
Section 68130.5 of the California Education Code also does not confer 
eligibility on the basis of residence, but bases eligibility on other criteria, 
including graduation from a California high school, which apply to all 
individuals seeking the benefit.292  Both the Kansas and California statutes 
are therefore in compliance with the two conditions set forth in § 1623 and 
lawfully provide undocumented students with in-state tuition rate benefits. 
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B.   The Ability of States to Provide In-State Tuition Rates to Undocumented 
Students Is Not Field Preempted 
States are not field preempted from providing postsecondary education 
benefits to undocumented students simply because the undocumented are 
noncitizens.293  While power to regulate immigration is within the exclusive 
realm of the federal government,294 not all state regulations affecting 
noncitizens are regulations of immigration.295  Federal law does not state 
law unless either the nature of the regulated subject matter so clearly 
indicates that authority over it rests with the federal government, or 
Congress has unmistakably given the power to the federal government.296  
As held in both De Canas and Toll, state regulations affecting noncitizens 
will be upheld as within the realm of state regulatory authority, so long as 
they do not add to or take away from the conditions Congress has decided 
to place upon the admission, naturalization, and residence of noncitizens in 
the United States.297  Thus, to enact valid legislation, states must simply 
comply with the plain and unambiguous language of § 1623, which set forth 
the conditions that define the reach of the preempted field of state 
legislation providing postsecondary education benefits to undocumented 
students.298  Those conditions do not require all U.S. citizens to receive the 
same benefits as those granted to undocumented immigrants, but only that 
citizens be given the same opportunity to be considered for such a 
benefit.299  Therefore, state statutes that are in compliance with § 1623, 
such as those in Kansas and California, are not field preempted by federal 
law because they do not add to or take away from the conditions imposed 
by Congress.300 
C.  The Ability of States to Provide In-State Tuition Rates to Undocumented 
Students Is Not Conflict Preempted 
Opponents of in-state tuition for undocumented students argue that states 
providing the benefit face conflict preemption.301  However, the argument 
that providing in-state tuition to undocumented students would stand as an 
obstacle to Congress fulfilling the objectives of PRWORA and IIRIRA to 
disincentivize illegal immigration is weak.302  The undocumented children 
who would gain from postsecondary education benefits form only a small 
percentage of the undocumented immigrant population in the United 
States.303  In addition, state provision of in-state tuition rates to the 
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relatively small population of undocumented students cannot be considered 
an obstacle to Congress’s objectives in PRWORA and IIRIRA, as they 
were overall unsuccessful pieces of legislation that were not able to deter 
illegal immigration.304  Moreover, § 1623, which was enacted as a part of 
IIRIRA, indicates that in-state tuition is a permitted benefit so long as it is 
not based on residence.305  Therefore, conflict preemption cannot exist 
where state legislation granting in-state tuition to undocumented students is 
in compliance with the measures set forth by Congress through IIRIRA in 
§ 1623. 
D.  Judicial Deference and the Need for a Legislative Solution 
Because the California Supreme Court is the only court to have thus far 
decided the § 1623 preemption issue,306 the lawfulness of state statutes 
offering in-state tuition rates to undocumented students remains unclear.  
Further delaying resolution of the issue is the fact that federal courts have 
held that plaintiffs have no standing to bring preemption claims, effectively 
destroyed the ability of private individuals to bring enforcement actions 
under § 1623 in federal court.307  The apparent reluctance of federal courts 
to address the issue likely reflects the judiciary’s traditional deference to the 
other branches of government in immigration regulation.308 
The difficulty of resolving the § 1623 preemption issue is also 
compounded by the fact that, in addition to the courts’ deferential avoidance 
of the issue, the federal government has not taken any action to enforce 
§ 1623 against state laws granting in-state tuition benefits.309  The U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security is responsible for enforcing federal 
immigration laws, yet has failed even to respond to complaints alleging that 
state laws violated IIRIRA’s provisions against postsecondary education 
benefits.310  Due to the federal government’s inaction in enforcing § 1623 
and the federal courts’ reluctance to decide the issue of whether states can 
lawfully provide in-state tuition benefits to undocumented students, the 
justiciability of the issue remains at a standstill and the best hope for a 
resolution rests with Congress. 
Legislative responses to the issue include Congress’s attempts to pass the 
DREAM Act, which would repeal § 1623.311  Part of the difficulty in 
passing the DREAM Act lies in the fact that immigration law reform today 
is no longer approached through piecemeal efforts in Congress, but through 
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an omnibus strategy due to the “transcendent complexity [of immigration 
reform], with so many interrelated moving parts, that [immigration law] 
cannot be incrementally reformed.”312  Thus, the hopes for reforming 
policies regarding postsecondary education opportunities for undocumented 
students are inextricably tied to other immigration reform issues, such as 
employment and border security.313 
As a matter of fairness and good policy, Congress should continue to 
place full efforts behind passing legislation that recognizes the value of 
providing postsecondary education opportunities for those long-term 
undocumented students who received much of their basic education in the 
United States, as they are entitled to under Plyler v. Doe.314  Though Plyler 
does not give undocumented students the right to a postsecondary 
education, there is an inherent unfairness in denying undocumented 
students the opportunity to pursue those dreams of higher education that 
were nurtured through the basic education they received in the United 
States.  The feelings of disentitlement and helplessness that develop in 
undocumented children as a result of the insurmountable barriers to higher 
education surely resonate with the feelings of inferiority that the Court 
sought to prevent in Brown v. Board of Education.315 
Restricting the postsecondary education opportunities of undocumented 
students also prevents the federal and state governments from reaping 
economic benefits that were cultivated in these young adults.316  The states 
have already invested in undocumented children by providing them with a 
basic education.  Allowing these children to earn their postsecondary 
degrees, and thus secure better job opportunities, would mean that they 
could earn higher salaries and make higher tax contributions as adults.317  
For the benefit of undocumented children, the states, and the nation as a 
whole, Congress needs to pass legislation that supports deserving 
undocumented students seeking a higher education.  Until Congress offers 
these students a pathway to lawful immigration status and gives the states 
back their authority to regulate their postsecondary education benefits by 
repealing § 1623, countless undocumented students will remain prisoners of 
an immigration status that they acquired by no fault of their own. 
CONCLUSION 
Many undocumented young adults who have grown up as productive 
members of American society discover only at the footsteps of receiving a 
higher education that their dreams are barred by an unlawful immigration 
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status due to no fault of their own.  The ultimate solution to this injustice is 
federal legislation opening up a path for deserving undocumented students 
to obtain lawful immigration status and the opportunity for higher 
education.  Unfortunately, it is unclear whether Congress will pass such 
legislation. 
Though an incomplete solution, state legislation granting undocumented 
students in-state tuition rates can help alleviate these students’ fears of 
being unable to pursue their goals and help them to remain productive 
members of society.  Having already invested in these young adults with 
primary and secondary education, states should recognize the potential for 
these undocumented students to contribute to society.  Thus, out of both 
pragmatism and compassion, states should offer their undocumented 
students in-state tuition rates according to terms that are carefully crafted to 
comply with § 1621 and § 1623. 
